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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
Case No. 
16421 
DAVID HARMON MEINHART, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, David Harmon Meinhart, appeals 
from a conviction of aggravated assault, a felony in the 
third degree, in the Third Judicial District Court, in and 
for Salt Lake county, State of Utah, the Honorable David B. 
Dee, Judge, presiding. 
DISPOSITIOtl IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant, David Harmon Meinhart, was 
charged with aggravated assault pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-103 (1953), as amended. Onthel6th day of February, 
1979, the appellant was found guilty of the offense as 
charged by a jury. Subsequently, the appellant was sentenced 
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to incarceration in the Utah State Prison for an indeter-
minate term not to exceed five years. Execution of 
sentence was stayed pending appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of appellant's 
conviction. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On May 30, 1978, Gloria Hintz entrusted her 
eighteen month old daughter, Angela, to the care of 
appellant (T.l3,164,193). During the evening appellant 
became frustrated and angry with Angela. He responded 
by slapping her and striking her head with the heel of 
his hand (T.25,54,58,107,108,112,115; Interrogation 
Transcript 25,26,27,28,29,34,58), a blow appellant 
admitted was a karate punch (Interrogation Transcript 113) 
This beating caused the child to suffer a fractured skull, 
blood clot, and brain damage which resulted in permanent 
paralysis of her left arm as well as mental and motor 
retardation (T.76,89,91,92,104,107,108,109). 
During the investigation of this incident 
police officers, having failed to contact appellant at 
the home of his parents, left word there that they wanted 
to speak with him (T.llS). On June 1, 1978, appellant's 
mother drove him to the Metropolitan Hall of Justice 
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where appellant voluntarily presented himself to police 
officers for discussion of the incident of May 30th 
(T.ll4,ll5,ll8,134). Present during the questioning 
of appellant were two police officers (T.ll4). They 
spoke with appellant for twenty minutes. Then, because 
at the time appellant's responses lead the officers to 
suspect that appellant was responsible for Angela's 
injuries, they warned him of his constitutional rights 
as required by Miranda (T.l39, Interrogation Transcript 
92). Appellant acknowledged that he understood each 
right explained to him (Interrogation Transcript 21, 93). 
When the officer asked appellant whether he desired to 
have an attorney present during the interview, appellant 
asked, "what would be better?" The officer's response 
was: 
It's up to you. It's like we 
talked about. You know if you'd talk 
to an attorney, he'd tell you not to say 
anything. You know that. We talked 
about that. It's up to you. Like I 
said, I think we can - if we get down 
to the bare facts, we can present it to 
our County Attorney and we can go from 
there. You're gonna feel a hell of a 
lot better once it's out in the open, 
that's- I know that for a fact. 
(Interrogation Transcript 21.) 
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Appellant replied that he did not need an attorney 
(Interrogation Transcript 21). This entire interview 
lasted two hours and twenty minutes with interruptions 
so appellant could freely use the restroom and smoke 
a cigarette (T.l20). Appellant was never told that he 
was under arrest and he freely left the Hall of Justice 
at the completion of the interview. 
Appellant was 20 years and 11 months old 
when he spoke to the officers. He had an eleventh 
grade education. Although appellant's father testified 
that appellant was functioning at a level two years 
behind that of his peers, there is no indication either 
from his response to questioning at trial or from his 
replies to police questioning that appellant had 
difficulty understanding 1-1hat was being asked of him. 
As appellant noted, the police officer did make two 
remarks regarding psychiatric help (Interrogation Transcr:.~: 
33,36), but they were made after appellant had confessed :c 
having repeatedly struck P~gela Janda (Interrogation 
Transcript 25,26,27,28,29). 
ARGUHENT 
POINT I 
QUESTIONING OF APPELLANT \vAS 
NOT CUSTODIAL. THEREFORE, THE FACT 
THhT HE \vAS !JOT GIVE!l /1IRA!:DA \vARNINGS 
PRIOR TO THE C01,1HEtlCE/1ENT OF THE POLICE 
HlT2RVIE\I DOES NOT REQUIRE SUPPRESSIO!J 
OF APPELL.Z\.llT I s CO:lFESS I Ot\. 
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In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L.Ed.2d 
694, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966), the United States Supreme Court 
established procedural safeguards to protect an individual's 
privilege against self-incrimination while in custody or 
"otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any 
significant way. Id. at 478. A subsequent Supreme 
Court decision reiterated the concern that individuals be 
given Miranda warnings prior to custodial interrogation, but 
rejected the argument that the principle of Miranda be 
extended to cover interrogation in non-custodial circumstances 
merely because police investigation had concentrated upon the 
individual being questioned. Beckwith v. United States, 425 
U.S. 341, 48 L.Ed.2d 1, 96 S.Ct. 1612 (1976). 
In order to determine whether the Miranda 
requirements are applicable in the present case the threshold 
question to be answered is whether appellant was in custody 
or deprived of his freedom during interrogation. In the 
recent decision of Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 
50 L.Ed.2d 714, 97 S.Ct. 711 (1977), the Supreme Court 
:ocused upon those aspects of police questioning which 
should be considered by the lower courts in determining 
whe~her police questioning was "custodial," and therefore 
:.:-1c;gcTed the necesslty of g1.ving the Miranda warnings. 
':'he Court fou:~d that the Oregon Supreme Court "read Miranda 
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too broadly" when it concluded that an interrogation was 
"custodial" merely because the suspect was questioned in 
a "coercive environment." Id. at 493. The Court 
emphasized that the psychological compulsion of an 
intimidating atmosphere is not sufficient to render 
an interrogation "custodial." 
Appellant's attempt to distinguish the 
facts of Mathiason from those of the case under considera-
tion is not successful because of the exaggerated 
importance he places upon the atmosphere of the intervie.,. 
rather thar. ::!-.e restraint on freedom which the Mathiason 
Court announced as the determinative factor in the 
establishment of "custodial" interrogation. A review of 
the circumstances of 1'-lathiason's interrogation in fact 
reveals a striking similarity to that of appellant. After 
several unsuccessful attempts to contact Mathiason, a 
state policeman left a note asking him to call the officer. 
Mathiason, a parolee, called the following day and agreed 
to meet the officer at a state patrol office. During the 
interview, which took place behind closed doors, Mathiasor 
was told that the police suspected him of burglary and hlS 
truthfulness would possibly be considered by the judge or 
prosecutor. The officer also falsely told Mathiason tha: 
his fingerprints had been found at the scene of thee cc-:...."1~. 
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Mathiason stated that he had taken the property, at which 
point the officer advised him of his Miranda rights and 
taped his confession. When the interview ended Mathiason 
was allowed to leave. The facts of the present case present 
precisely the same pattern except appellant was not a 
parolee and the officers mentioned no incriminating evidence. 
As in the Mathiason case, police officers left a message 
with appellant's parents requesting that he contact the 
officers. The following day appellant phoned the police 
and agreed to meet them at the Hetropolitan Hall of Justice. 
Appellant was accompanied by his mother, but she was not 
not present during the interview which took place in the 
detectives' office. After twenty minutes of conversation, 
appellant became the primary suspect in the police investi-
gation. The officer informed appellant of his Miranda rights, 
wh1ch he acknowledged understanding. In addition, the officer 
informed appellant that an attorney would probably advise him 
not to speak with police regarding the incident under 
invest1gation. Appellant indicated he had no need of an 
attorney. He confessed that he had struck eighteen month 
old Angela Janda several times (Interrogation Transcript 
25,26,27,28,29,34,36). Appellant's confession was taped and 
he was allowed to leave. 
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The main thrust of appellant's argument is 
that his confession should be suppressed in spite of 
the fact that he was advised of his constitutional 
rights. This argument misconstrues the purpose of 
those rights. As the Utah Supreme Court stated in 
State v. Martinez, 595 P.2d 897 (Utah 1979): 
[The Miranda rights) came into 
being as a safeguard against oppressive 
methods and abuses by which innocent 
persons were imposed on and sometimes 
unjustly convicted and punished. 
But neither their purpose, nor the 
safeguarding of the peace and good 
order of society are served if the 
pro~ection of individual rights is so 
d~s~arted as to give irresponsible 
protections to criminal conduct and 
impose such restrictions on peace 
officers that they are thwarted in their 
efforts to combat crime. 
Id. at 899 (eQphasis added). 
It is clear from the record that appellant 
was no more "deprived of his freedom of action in any 
significant way'' than was Mathiason. Id. at 495 (quoting 
Miranda, 384 u.s. at 444). The Mathiason Court held: 
Id. at 495. 
. such a noncustodial situation 
is not converted into one in which Miranda 
applies simply because a reviewing court 
concludes that, even in the absence of any 
formal arrest or restraint on freedom of 
movement, the questioning took place in a 
coercive environment. 
-8-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The setting of the interview which appellant 
describes as coercive was not sufficient to render the 
police questioning· "custodial," and therefore did 
not trigger the necessity of apprising appellant of his 
constitutional rights. Yet shortly after the interview 
began the officer realized that appellant's contradictory 
statements might be an indication of his culpability. 
This realization prompted the officer in his sensitive 
awareness of the judicial concern regarding police 
protocal, to advise appellant of his Miranda rights. 
In doing so he exceeded his duty by explaining to 
appellant that an attorney would advise him not to 
discuss his behavior with the police. The circumstances 
of this case demand that the Utah Supreme Court follow 
the precedent of State v. Burr, 579 P.2d 331 (Utah 1978), 
and hold the Mathiason decision controlling. 
POIUT II 
EXN1INATION OF THE TOTALITY OF THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES PRESENTED IN THIS CASE 
INDICATES APPELLANT'S CONFESSION WAS 
GIVEN VOLUNTARILY AND THUS WAS PROPERLY 
ADNIT'I'ED IN EVIDENCE. 
In the absence of a showing of abuse of 
discretion, the Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld 
trial court determinations that an accused's confession 
had been given voluntarily. State v. Ashdown, 5 Utah 2d 59, 
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296 P.2d 726 (1956). See also: State v. Hunt, 
p.2d (Utah, February 14, 1980, No. 16437), State v. 
Adams, 583 P.2d 89 (1978); State v. Peterson, 560 P.2d 
1387 (1977); State v. Winkle, 535 P. 2d 82 (197 5); State 
v. Allen, 29 Utah 2d 88, 505 P.2d 303 (1973); State v. 
Strohm, 23 Utah 2d 37, 456 P.2d 170 (1969). In the 
present case there is a substantial and reasonable basis 
to support the trial court's finding that appellant's 
confession was voluntary. During a pretrial hearing 
evidence of the circumstances of appellant's confession 
was presen~ed and the deter~mination of admissibility was 
made. At trial appellant's father testified on his son's 
behalf and explained that appellant had had an accident 
which left him susceptible to suggestion. ~he jury then 
determined the credibility of the witnesses and the 
evidentiary value of the confession, returning a verdict 
convicting appellant. Review of the totality of the 
circumstances of appellant's confession does not reveal 
any "abuse, threats, coercion, or promises of reward or 
immunity on the part of the officers" which would negate 
the validity of appellant's confession. State v. Hunt, 
P.2d (Utah, February 14, 1980, No. 16437). 
Appellant contends that the officer's 
suggestion that appellant would "feel a hell of a lot 
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better once it's all out in the open" (Interrogation 
Transcript 21) impaired appellant's ability to make a 
rational choice. Such reference to the cathartic 
benefits of discussing the incident with police officers 
in a noncustodial situation after being warned of his 
Miranda rights could not have engendered such psychological 
pressure as to exert substantial influence upon appellant's 
will. Neither could such reference be interpreted as a 
promise to reduce the severity of the legal consequences 
of the criminal act. The mere suggestion to appellant 
that confession would make him feel better is no reason 
to exclude the confession as involuntary. The United 
States Supreme Court indicated in Culombe v. Connecticut, 
367 u.s. 568, 81 s.ct. 1860 (1961), that such a confession 
should not be invalidated. 
Id. at 576. 
(1897). 
. a confession is not always the 
result of an overborne will. The police 
may be the midwife to a declaration 
naturally born of remorse, relief or 
desperation, or calculation. 
See also Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 
Appellant also contends that the two references 
to psychiatric counseling (Interrogation Transcript 34, 36) 
made by the police officer was a~ inducement to confess 
which rendered appellant's confession involuntary. This 
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argument is without merit because the officer's reference 
to therapeutic help occurred after appellant had confessed 
to the act of aggravated assault. It is indeed tortured 
reasoning which concludes that statements made after a 
confession could have "induced" the confession itself. 
Finally, appellant contends that he was a callow youth, 
confused, coerced, and therefore unable to withstand the 
pressures of questioning. This argument is baseless. 
Appellant was twenty years and eleven months old at the 
time of the police interview. Accompanied by his mother, 
appellant voluntarily presented himself at the detective's 
office and was free to leave to smoke, free to leave and 
go to the bathroom, free to leave and get an attorney, and 
free to leave when the interview terminated. Appellant was 
not under arrest and the questioning was not custodial. 
Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 50 L.Ed.2d 714, 97 S.Ct. 
711 (1977). Appellant was responsive to questioning and 
demonstrated a clear understanding of what was being asked 
of him. He possessed an eleventh grade education. 
Appellant was advised of his constitutional rights, then 
chose to answer the officer's questions. Almost immediately 
after being informed of his rights, appellant confessed tha: 
he did repeatedly strike Angela Janda (Interrogation Tran-
script 25). There is no evidence of physical abuse, threats 
or promises made on the part of police officers which could 
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have overborne appellant's will thus rendering his 
confession involuntary. In light of the totality of 
the circumstances, appellant's confession was properly 
admitted in evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the circumstances of this case 
it is apparent that police questioning of appellant was 
not custodial, and therefore did not warrant the giving 
of Miranda warnings at the outset of the interview. The 
fact that appellant was fully apprised of his constitu-
tional rights is one factor of many which tipped the 
balance in favor of finding that appellant's confession 
was freely given. In view of the totality of the 
circumstances of this case, the trial court finding 
that appellant's confession was voluntary was not an 
abuse of discretion, and therefore should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
ROBERT R. l'iALLACE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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